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This article is concerned with the events of 16 August 2012 at the Lonmin Marikana mine in the 
North West province, when members of the South African Police Service killed 34 people, most of 
whom were striking mineworkers. These killings, now widely referred to as the Marikana massacre, 
are regarded not only as a tragedy but also as an event of great significance in South Africa’s 
contemporary history. A commission of inquiry was held into the killings, but it did not reach any 
conclusions about what had happened at the second massacre site, commonly referred to as 
Scene 2, at which 17 of the fatal shootings took place. While these events are now the subject of 
an investigation by police oversight and criminal justice agencies, we cannot assume that this will 
reveal the truth about the killings at Scene 2. To add to our understanding of the events at Marikana, 
this article analyses statements from the injured and arrested strikers taken by the Independent 
Police Investigative Directorate in the five days immediately after the massacre. This article examines 
data from the statements, and the circumstances in which these statements were taken, in order to 
interrogate the assertion that ‘strikers were shot by police while surrendering or injured at Scene 2’.1 
It concludes that, taken as a whole, the statements are a reliable source of information that some of 
the strikers at Scene 2 were indeed shot while surrendering.
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On 16 August 2012, 34 men, most of them 
mineworkers2 who were on strike for higher 
wages at the Lonmin Marikana platinum mine in 
North West province, were killed by members 
of the South African Police Service (SAPS). 
This incident, which has come to be known as 
the Marikana massacre,3 followed a week of 
conflict at the Lonmin mine. At the time of the 
massacre there had already been 10 deaths 
in strike-related conflict. Two SAPS members 
and three strikers were killed in a confrontation 
between police and strikers on Monday 13 
August. In other incidents between Sunday 12 
and Tuesday 14 August, two Lonmin security 
guards, one striker and two other mineworkers 
were also killed. Altogether seven of these 
people – including the two SAPS members and 
five others – are known to have been, or are 
likely to have been, killed by strikers.4 
The massacre on 16 August took place during 
two distinct shooting episodes. One of these 
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occurred just before 4 pm (15h54). The other, 
at a location 500 m away from the first, started 
15 minutes later, at about 16h09. In each of 
these episodes 17 people were killed – 34 
people in total. These two episodes have come 
to be known as (crime) Scene 1 and Scene 2. 
This article focuses on aspects of the evidence 
regarding the killings at Scene 2, provided in 
statements taken by the Independent Police 
Investigative Directorate (IPID)5 from injured 
and arrested strikers in the days immediately 
after the massacre. Some of these statements 
contain allegations that some of the people shot 
at Scene 2 were shot while surrendering. This 
article assesses the reliability of these allegations. 
The official response to the strike 
The strike was an unprotected one that took 
place outside of the formal collective bargaining 
process. Although the strikers were acting as 
an autonomous group,6 the strike occurred 
amid conflict between the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM), then the dominant labour 
union in mining and one of the biggest unions 
in South Africa, and an emergent union, the 
Association of Mineworkers and Construction 
Union (AMCU), over supremacy within the 
platinum industry. In the aftermath of the 
commodities boom, Lonmin itself was in financial 
trouble7 and therefore strongly resistant to the 
possibility of a pay increase, particularly one 
that was being demanded by an informally 
constituted group of workers.  
A complex mix of factors combined in shaping 
the official response to the strike. On the one 
hand the violent nature of the strike itself, 
particularly the killing of the two police officers 
on the 13th, appears to have hardened attitudes 
towards the strikers. The position and influence 
of Cyril Ramaphosa, then a non-executive 
director of Lonmin and senior member of the 
ruling African National Congress’s National 
Executive Committee, also contributed to the 
sense of urgency about responding to the 
matter. The strike was seen as a threat to the 
interests of the NUM itself, at the time one of 
the largest members of the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions and therefore an integral 
and important member of the ruling political and 
labour ‘tripartite’8 alliance. There was additional 
anxiety in official quarters that the strike might 
be exploited by a charismatic political leader, 
Julius Malema. Malema had previously been 
president of the ruling party’s Youth League, 
but at the time of the strike had recently been 
expelled from the party and had started to 
position himself as an adversary of both the 
ruling party and its president, Jacob Zuma. 
Earlier in 2012 he had intervened during a strike 
at the Impala platinum mine and was regarded 
by some as having defused the situation.9 There 
was concern that he might also obtain credit 
for resolving the situation at Marikana. The 
combined consequence of these factors was 
not only that the strikers were regarded with a 
degree of antipathy but also that bringing an 
end to the strike, if necessary by force, was 
treated as an urgent matter.  
Understanding the 
Marikana massacre
After the massacre, a commission of inquiry 
was appointed by Zuma. The report of the 
Marikana Commission of Inquiry was submitted 
to the president at the end of March 2015 
and released to the public in June 2015. 
Notwithstanding the findings of the commission, 
the Marikana massacre and the series of 
confrontations that preceded it remain a source 
of controversy. 
The killings by police that occurred on 
16 August have been justified by some 
commentators with reference to the killings and 
other violence perpetrated by people who were 
involved with the strike over the preceding days. 
For instance, during a public address the day 
before he released the report of the Marikana 
Commission, Zuma had said that ‘the Marikana 
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miners were shot after killing people’.10 The 
report of the Marikana Commission itself refers 
to the violence on the part of the strikers as a 
major contributing factor to the subsequent 
events.11 The tendency to allocate responsibility 
for the massacre to the strikers is reinforced 
by the fact that, for many people, their 
understanding of what took place at Marikana 
has primarily been shaped by the television 
footage of the shooting at Scene 1. Viewers of 
this footage are likely to believe that it shows 
police shooting strikers who are attacking them. 
It is not widely known, for instance, that the 
strikers ran towards the line of armed SAPS 
members only after teargas, stun grenades and 
rubber bullets had been fired behind, and into 
the side of, the group of strikers.12 This is likely 
to have propelled them towards police lines.  
On the other hand, many people have 
expressed anger about the massacre, calling 
for those responsible to be held accountable.13 
Considerable attention has been drawn to the 
political influences, including the likely role of 
political leaders, on the decision that police 
should disarm the strikers.14 The massacre 
has also been characterised as a product 
of reckless decisions made by the senior 
leadership of the SAPS, a breakdown in the 
senior command structure of the police at 
Marikana,15 and ‘toxic collusion’ between the 
SAPS and Lonmin.16 Others see the massacre 
as a product of deficiencies of public order 
policing, or other aspects of the policing system 
in South Africa.17 At the broadest level, the 
massacre has been depicted not simply as 
the result of human agency but as a result of 
‘the structural violence of apartheid … [which] 
remains a feature of the migrant labour system 
on which the mining industry, including platinum 
producers like Lonmin, continues to depend’.18
Many of these perspectives are relevant to 
understanding the events at Marikana in August 
2012. At the same time, key questions remain 
unanswered, and there is no broadly accepted 
explanation for what happened at Scene 2. Acts 
of violence can never purely be understood in 
terms of structural factors, and the actions of 
subordinates can also not be understood simply 
in terms of the decisions of their leaders.19 
This is especially pertinent to the killings at 
Scene 2. The evidence indicates that this part 
of the police operation was unplanned, with 
an absence of any significant command and 
control.20   
The shootings at Scene 1 and Scene 2
All of the people who were killed at Scene 1 
were shot in a single 12-second-long volley 
of simultaneous gunfire by 49 or more SAPS 
members, including 47 members of the SAPS 
Tactical Response Team, one Public Order 
Policing unit member and at least one SAPS 
member whose identity is unknown.21 Almost all 
of the police shooters were standing in a single 
line facing the oncoming strikers.22 Although 
Scene 1 was the subject of extensive scrutiny 
at the Marikana Commission, it did not come 
to any conclusions about whether the strikers 
had been attacking the police when the police 
opened fire on them. The Commission did, 
however, conclude that SAPS members who 
fired their weapons at the strikers during Scene 
1 ‘had reasonable grounds for believing they 
were under attack’,23 although some of them 
may have exceeded the bounds of reasonable 
private defence.24 A number of news agencies’ 
television crews captured footage of the incident, 
including from just behind the police line, which 
not only helped to clearly establish the basic 
facts of the shooting but also greatly improved 
the commission’s ability to analyse the incident.
The second shooting episode is entirely different. 
At Scene 2, the strikers who were shot were not 
concentrated in a single group or procession, 
and the police shooters fired at the strikers from 
a number of different positions.25 Although a 
similar number of rounds were used by police 
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at both incidents,26 the shootings at Scene 2 
extended over a period of 11 minutes compared 
to just over 12 seconds at Scene 1.27 There 
is also only evidence about the location from 
which 29% of these rounds were fired.28 
The shootings at Scene 2 started close to 15 
minutes after the shooting at Scene 1. Many of 
the strikers fled in a westerly direction after the 
first shooting. Some of their statements indicate 
that they tried to flee towards the informal 
settlements on the far west side, but went to 
hide instead in the Scene 2 area when they saw 
police approaching from that direction.29 Two 
other groups of police were approaching at the 
same time from the east and south.30 While this 
aspect of the police operation was unplanned it 
meant that strikers at Scene 2 were effectively 
surrounded, although the police who were 
involved themselves did not know this.
The Scene 2 area is roughly circular, with 
a diameter of about 200 m. A formation of 
large rocks lying north to south (‘the high 
rocks’) stands in a fairly central position and is 
identified by some people as a koppie (it was 
referred to as ‘Koppie 3’ or the ‘small koppie’ 
at the commission). Other parts are covered in 
grass. To the west of the southern end of the 
high rocks is an area that is strewn with large 
boulders. This part of the Scene 2 area was 
overgrown by thick bushes and small trees at 
the time of the massacre. It is referred to by 
some as the ‘killing zone’.31
Analysis of the events of Scene 2 has identified 
a number of distinct groups of victims.32 The 
largest of these groups is comprised of 11 
of the 17 deceased, all of whom were fatally 
injured in the ‘killing zone’ area.33 As described 
in the report of the Marikana Commission, this 
group was ‘killed in what can be described as 
a crevice in a rocky area … where they appear 
to have sought refuge during the operation’.34 
Some of the photographs that were taken from 
police helicopters during the Scene 2 shootings 
show striking workers huddled in this area, 
apparently trying to take cover from the water 
cannons and police gunfire.35 The statements 
about strikers who were shot while surrendering 
appear to originate from strikers who were in or 
near to the killing zone. 
The SAPS failure to account for the 
Scene 2 killings  
The Marikana Commission made no findings 
about the reasonableness or legality of the 
police shootings at Scene 2. The commission 
did, however, remark that the SAPS ‘provided 
no details of what happened with regard to the 
deaths of most of the deceased’ and that where 
it had provided evidence this ‘did not bear 
scrutiny when weighed up against the objective 
evidence’.36 In effect, therefore, the commission 
found that the SAPS had not managed to 
provide a coherent account for any of the 
deaths at Scene 2. 
The commission’s inability to reach any 
conclusive findings about the circumstances of 
the killings at Scene 2 was owing not only to 
the lack of coherence of the SAPS account but 
also to the fact that SAPS members (at various 
levels) made a concerted effort to conceal the 
facts of what had occurred. This obfuscation 
started shortly after the shootings at Scene 2, 
when SAPS members planted weapons on the 
bodies of six of the deceased strikers.37 
The day after the massacre, SAPS National 
Commissioner Riah Phiyega issued a press 
statement that was a modified version of an 
account of the events that had been provided 
to her by police commanders. The initial written 
account that Phiyega had received made it clear 
that the killings by police had taken place in 
two separate incidents. However, the statement 
issued by the National Commissioner created 
the impression that the killings had taken place 
in one continuous flow of events and concealed 
the fact that there were two distinct shooting 
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locations.38 After the initial confrontation 
(identifiable as Scene 1), the press statement 
describes the strikers storming towards 
the police while ‘firing shots and wielding 
dangerous weapons’.39 The initial written 
account that Phiyega had received from the 
SAPS commanders did not describe the strikers 
attacking police in the second incident.40 
Over the following months, the SAPS generated 
a more detailed account of the events at Scene 
2, which formed part of its opening presentation 
to the commission in early November 2012.41 
The commission roundly rejected this version, 
because it was inconsistent with other objective 
evidence.42 Analysis of the statements provided 
by many of the SAPS members also casts 
doubt on whether these can be regarded as an 
accurate account of the events at Scene 2.43 
In light of the absence of clear evidence that 
the shootings at Scene 2 had been lawful, 
the commission referred the entire matter 
for an investigation, to be supervised by the 
North West Director of Public Prosecutions, 
to ascertain the criminal liability of all SAPS 
members who were involved in the shooting.44 In 
August 2017, IPID reported that it had submitted 
all dockets pertaining to the massacre to the 
National Prosecution Authority. However, owing 
to budgetary constraints, IPID had not been 
able to carry out a reconstruction of the events 
of Scene 2, despite the fact that this had been 
recommended by the Marikana Commission.45
The time of writing – August 2018 – marks six 
years since the massacre. Despite the Marikana 
massacre’s being designated as a watershed 
moment in South Africa’s post-apartheid 
history,46 there is still no detailed information 
in the public domain about what happened at 
Scene 2. The official process for investigating 
the massacre has now moved from fact finding 
to criminal investigation and prosecution. No 
police have, however, been prosecuted for the 
killings at either Scene 1 or 247 and it remains 
unclear whether there is adequate evidence to 
prosecute any of those involved. This may be 
related to the difficulty in securing the necessary 
evidence to ensure a successful prosecution. 
Virtually all of those who were killed were 
shot with R5 rounds. These rounds splinter 
on impact, which means that it has thus far 
not been possible to link any of the deaths to 
specific firearms using forensic techniques. 
The ballistics evidence shows that most of the 
victims were fatally wounded by shots fired 
from some distance away, which means that 
few, if any, of the survivors are likely to be able 
to identify the police officers who shot strikers.48 
Up to this point, SAPS members have largely 
closed ranks to protect themselves and their 
colleagues against being incriminated for the 
killings. Even if prosecutions are instituted, 
they may not necessarily provide greater clarity 
about the killings.     
Shot while surrendering?
The Marikana Commission had access to a 
variety of evidence about the events at Scene 
2. This included ballistic and forensic evidence, 
photographs (taken intermittently from police 
helicopters), recordings from the police radio49 
and video evidence (although not of any of the 
actual shootings). Beyond this, the evidence 
files from the commission provide other sources 
of information, including statements by strikers 
and SAPS members.
A sentence in the final submission to the 
Marikana Commission by the lawyers for the 
South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC) states that ‘[f]orty strikers who were 
injured and/or arrested on 16 August allege that 
strikers were shot by police while surrendering 
or injured at Scene 2’.50 These allegations 
are contained in statements taken by IPID 
personnel from strikers who were injured and 
hospitalised, or who had been arrested and 
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were in the holding cells at a number of different 
police stations in the vicinity of Marikana.  
During the research on which this article is 
based, 57 statements were identified that 
asserted that strikers had been ‘shot while 
surrendering’ (SWS) at Scene 2. This article 
aims to deepen the process of fact-finding 
initiated by the Marikana Commission by 
evaluating the credibility of this assertion. In 
doing so it also aims to contribute to research 
about violence and the use of force by police, 
and to support the victims’ families (and the 
public) in their quest to get closer to the truth 
about the killings at Marikana.  
The approach taken in this article is not to 
focus on the testimony of specific individuals 
but to examine collectively a group of narratives 
recorded in the five days immediately following 
the massacre. Analysis of this body of 
information as a whole was never presented 
to the commission, and it has not as yet 
been used to establish the facts about what 
happened at Scene 2. 
Identifying statements from strikers who 
were at Scene 2
The line in the SAHRC final submission referring 
to the allegations that strikers were shot while 
surrendering is based on the summaries of 
statements of injured and arrested strikers that 
are contained in Annexure G to the SAHRC 
submission.51 In Annexure G, 138 of the 279 
summarised statements are classified as 
statements that deal with the events at Scene 
2. Copies of all of the statements, collated into 
a number of large PDF files, were provided to 
the researcher by the Marikana Commission 
evidence leaders. Analysis of the statements 
formed part of a larger project focused on 
understanding the events at Scene 2,52 and 
data analysis for this article started with the 
reading of these 138 statements. In addition, 
roughly 50 other statements were read. These 
were selected on an ad hoc basis by referring to 
the summary provided in Annexure G. 
One of the initial challenges was differentiating 
statements with information about Scene 2 
from other statements. In statements that dealt 
with Scene 2 the arrested or injured strikers 
generally described themselves as fleeing after 
a first shooting incident (Scene 1) and going to 
hide at another place. It was self-evident that 
a statement could be classified as related to 
Scene 2 where it described a second shooting 
incident at a place where a number of people 
were also killed. Statements were also included 
if the person described themselves as hiding at 
a place with geographical or physical features 
consistent with Scene 2. For example, many of 
the statements described hiding among ‘rocks’ 
or ‘stones’, referred to the place as a ‘koppie’ or 
‘mountain’, or identified it by the bushes or trees 
covering the area.53
Altogether 153 statements were deemed as 
likely to have originated from strikers who had 
been present at Scene 2. This number includes 
134 of the 138 statements classified by the 
SAHRC lawyers as Scene 2 statements, and 19 
others. The 153 statements include 148 from 
arrested strikers who were being held in custody 
at police stations,54 as well as five statements 
from strikers in hospital. 
Evidence of possible unreliability  
Twenty-nine of the 153 statements (19%) were 
eventually excluded from the analysis because 
they had features indicating that they might be 
unreliable. Some of these statements contained 
assertions that were inconsistent with the 
evidence before the commission. For example, 
nine statements contained the obviously untrue 
assertion that strikers were unarmed or (for 
instance) had sticks but no spears. Another 
example of this type of inconsistency was 
statements that held that police in armoured 
vehicles (deliberately) drove over strikers fleeing 
from Scene 1. No deceased or injured strikers 
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from the statement taker (see the discussion 
below). Nevertheless, it raised doubts about the 
degree to which these statements represented 
the experience of specific individuals, and they 
were consequently excluded. 
Table 1 summarises the final sample of 153 
statements, showing how these were classified 
in one of four categories based on the type of 
Scene 2 shooting description (or absence of 
shooting description) that they provide. 
Descriptions of the shootings 
in the statements
Reframed, absent or truncated information 
Virtually all (259 out of 271) of the people 
arrested by the SAPS at Marikana were arrested 
at Scene 2.57 Police used 295 rounds of live 
ammunition at Scene 2, making it hard to imagine 
that anyone at Scene 2 would not have been 
aware of the shootings. It is reasonable to expect, 
therefore, that almost all of the statements from 
arrested miners should provide information about 
Scene 2. Yet only 153 of the statements were 
identifiable as originating from strikers who were 
at Scene 2. Of these statements more than a 
quarter (39) contained no description of any 
shooting (see Table 1). This raises the question as 
to why there were not more statements that were 
identifiable as originating from strikers who were 
at Scene 2 and that provided clear information 
about the Scene 2 shootings. 
had injuries that were consistent with this 
allegation. These statements were removed 
because the assertions that they contained 
raised questions about the reliability of the 
witness’s overall account.  
Not all of the statements with factually incorrect 
assertions were removed from the sample. For 
example, 20 of the 153 statements alleged 
that soldiers had been involved in the police 
operation at Marikana. No South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF) members were 
involved in the ground operation, but one of the 
SAPS units that were deployed, the Special Task 
Force (STF), wears military type camouflage 
uniforms and uses vehicles that are painted 
similarly to military vehicles. These personnel 
could reasonably be mistakenly identified as 
military personnel.
The review of statements also took into 
account the possibility that the strikers had 
collaborated in preparing their statements 
to ensure that they corroborated each other 
(known as homogenisation).55 Homogenisation 
is identifiable when very similar language is used 
in different statements. However, no evidence 
of collaboration was identified. A series of four 
statements, taken by a single statement taker 
on 19 August 2012, showed a high level of 
similarity in terms of language and structure, 
although not in relation to all of the allegations 
that they contained.56 The degree of uniformity 
between these statements may have originated 
Table 1: Classification of statements included and excluded by type of shooting description 
Type of shooting description at Scene 2 Present at 
Scene 2
Excluded 
due to 
possible 
unreliability
Final 
sample of 
statements
% of final 
sample
No Scene 2 shooting described 39 7 32 26%
Scene 2 shot while surrendering 57 11 46 37%
Other Scene 2 shooting description 52 9 43 35%
Shot while surrendering described but unclear if at 
Scene 1 or Scene 2 
5 2 3 2%
Total 153 29 124 100%
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A general feature of most of the statements 
is that they provide an extremely abbreviated 
account of the events of 16 August 2012, 
and there is no clear differentiation between 
the events at Scene 1 and Scene 2. This is 
consistent with existing knowledge of police 
statement taking, where statement takers 
tend to truncate the account provided by 
victims or witnesses.58 Statement takers also 
frequently reframe the verbal account provided 
to them in order to capture what they regard 
as the key salient information. In so doing they 
decide ‘what to include, what to exclude and 
what precise formulations to use’.59 It is worth 
recalling that the statements were taken as 
part of an IPID investigation into the events 
at Marikana. IPID performs an investigative 
function that resembles police investigation, 
and many IPID personnel are former SAPS 
members.60 IPID statements are thus likely to 
have similar characteristics to statements taken 
by police. 
IPID investigators were deployed to the two 
Marikana crime scenes (i.e. Scene 1 and 2), 
arriving some hours after the shootings on the 
16th.61 However, it is not clear whether IPID 
personnel who were involved in statement 
taking had been informed about the fact 
that there were two crime scenes (in two 
distinct places) where shootings had taken 
place. Many of the statement takers would 
likely have seen the television footage of the 
shootings at Scene 1, which created the 
impression that the massacre had taken place 
entirely at Scene 1. It was only in the week 
after the massacre, when the IPID statement 
taking process was largely complete, that 
the first media report emerged indicating 
that there had been two massacre scenes.62 
Scene 2 was only exposed in the mainstream 
media two weeks after the massacre.63 
Apart from the television coverage, at the time 
when the statements were taken from the 
strikers by IPID personnel there was only one 
formal account of the massacre in the public 
domain. This was the statement issued by 
Phiyega on the day after the massacre, Friday 
17 August.64 As noted above, this statement 
had been modified in such a way as to create 
the impression that the killings had taken place 
in one continuous flow of events. The fact that 
many of the statements taken by IPID staff 
also describe the shootings in this way, may 
reflect that the statement takers interpreted the 
narrative accounts provided to them by strikers 
in terms of the television footage and media 
statements that they had been exposed to.
These factors are not only relevant to 
understanding why such a small proportion of 
statements appear to relate to the events at 
Scene 2, but may also explain why, even among 
those statements that do deal with the events at 
Scene 2, roughly a quarter provide no indication 
that there were any shootings there. The 
statement of Mr Mtshamba,65 the most widely 
known of the people who survived the killings 
at Scene 2, starkly illustrates these issues. 
Mtshamba was not only the principal small 
koppie survivor to give evidence before the 
Marikana Commission66 but was also a principal 
interviewee in the most widely read book 
about the massacre, and has been featured 
in television coverage and news articles about 
Scene 2.67 It is, however, not apparent from his 
IPID statement that he was present at Scene 2. 
In fact, in the SAHRC Annexure G his statement 
is classified as one that deals with Scene 1 but 
not with Scene 2.68   
Indiscriminate shootings by police 
Some statements describe what appears to 
be indiscriminate shooting by the police, but 
do not include information about anyone being 
shot while surrendering. For example, statement 
A366 describes:
I then realised that we were surrounded 
by the police [at Scene 1]. We ran to 
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a big stone (mountain) where we hide 
ourselves and they were busy shooting 
at us. I surrendered by raising my hands 
and [they] instructed me to lie down. I did 
as instructed. I noticed that in front of me 
there were ± 10 people lying on the ground 
shot dead.69
Statements in this category also include some 
in which the Scene 2 shooting is described in a 
few words, for example: ‘The police continued 
to shoot at us even at where we were hiding 
and some were killed.’70
These statements are of course not inconsistent 
with the assertion that some strikers were shot 
while surrendering. Considering the perfunctory 
nature of some statements it is possible that 
some strikers in this group were witnesses to 
shootings during surrender but that this was 
not captured in their statements. Alternatively, 
they may have been present at Scene 2, but 
may themselves not have witnessed incidents 
of this kind. Given the fact that the shootings 
took place in different parts of the Scene 2 area, 
all of the strikers at Scene 2 would not have 
witnessed exactly the same events.
Allegations of executions 
The issue of executions is relevant in relation to 
Scene 2 partly because two SAPS members 
provided written statements which said that, 
while police were searching the Scene 2 area 
after the shootings, a police officer had shot 
one of the strikers (neither statement confirms 
whether the shooting was fatal).71 
The statements were examined in order to 
establish whether there was evidence in 
the statements to support these claims, or 
other evidence of executions. In this process 
executions were defined as incidents where 
people who had already been subdued, or 
who were immobilised by injury, and were 
‘under the control’ of the police, were then 
killed. By this definition, evidence of shooting 
while surrendering is not equivalent to alleged 
executions. In general, the descriptions that are 
provided in the statements indicate that, when 
strikers were shot while surrendering, the police 
had not as yet established control over them. 
There are various confusing aspects about 
the allegations by the two SAPS members. 
They emerged more than a month after the 
massacre. The second SAPS member to make 
these allegations indicated that it was the SAPS 
member who had first made the allegations who 
had admitted to shooting one of the strikers, 
apparently while the police were arresting strikers 
after most of the shootings were over. None of 
the strikers’ statements clearly corroborates 
the account provided by either of these SAPS 
members. The statements also do not provide 
consistent evidence of other executions.
Credibility of ‘shot while 
surrendering’ allegations
More than a third (46) of the statements 
contained descriptions of strikers being shot 
while surrendering. For example, statement A238 
indicates that: 
We tried to hide ourselves under the big 
stones but that did not help. We decided 
to surrender ourselves to the police. People 
came out and lifted their hands. The first 
one who came out lifting his hands was 
shot on the hand but I am not sure which 
side and if he fell down. The second one 
was shot on the chest having lifted his 
hands as well. They were just shooting 
randomly at us until some of them told 
others to stop. They then stopped.72  
Another example is statement A22:
We ran as a small group and hide ourselves 
at the mountain. There were police officials 
who were following us. Some of them were 
at the back. Some of the people I hid with 
raised their hand up, begging the police 
to forgive them. One person who raised 
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his hand was shot down. Other one also 
raised his hands and he was also shot 
down. I saw a lot of bodies lying down 
there. I heard a voice from the police 
officials shouting stop. After that I did not 
hear any gun shot. Most of the people 
were shot while raising their hands and 
some were seated down on their hiding 
place. Most of us were armed with sticks 
but we dropped them when the police 
started shooting. They were shooting at 
us at about ± 50 m distance.73
Roughly 37 of these statements gave some 
indication of the number of people they had 
seen being shot while surrendering. Of these, 
eight statements clearly referred to one person 
who they saw being shot while surrendering, 
three referred to two people, two referred to 
three people and one referred to four people. 
Twenty-three statements used terms like ‘many’ 
or ‘few’ to refer to the number of people who 
were shot. For instance, statement A245 says: 
Many people were killed on that spot. 
Others tried to raise their hands but the 
police were shooting at them. I lied on the 
ground while the shooting continued for 
± 20 minutes. I saw one black male raising 
his hand but the police shot him.74
There is evidence that at least one of the 
men who was shot at Scene 1 tried to raise 
his hands during the shooting,75 and so the 
fact that a person describes someone being 
shot while surrendering does not in itself 
demonstrate that this is a description of events 
at Scene 2. There are three such statements 
that originate from people who describe being 
present at Scene 2, but are unclear whether 
the SWS incident that is alleged took place at 
Scene 2. Nevertheless, most of the statements 
that provide descriptions of people being shot 
while surrendering are referring to events at 
Scene 2 and not at Scene 1. 
The 124 statements that were retained in the 
sample for analysis were, at face value, not 
obviously unreliable. A concern may, however, 
still exist that the allegations of people being 
shot while surrendering were themselves not 
based on the direct experience of strikers, but 
emerged as a result of ‘rumours’ that spread 
among the strikers. It is conceivable that 
these allegations may have been influenced 
by a hostile disposition towards the police, or 
even have been the product of collusion to 
misrepresent the events at Scene 2 in order to 
hold police culpable for the killings. After the 
initial process of excluding statements that had 
features indicating that they might be unreliable, 
the research process therefore focused on 
whether there was reason to suspect that 
the SWS allegations were the product of 
collusion between the strikers, or whether 
there was evidence that the statements were a 
misrepresentation of the real experiences of the 
strikers who made them. 
Table 2 shows that the statements were all 
taken in the five-day period immediately after 
the Marikana massacre. Of the 124 statements, 
103 (83%) were taken within the first three days 
after the massacre and included statements 
taken at four different locations: one at Pelgerae 
Hospital, 64 at Bethanie Police Station,76 13 at 
Jericho Police Station and 21 at Phokeng Police 
Station. In four cases the locations were not 
specified. Of the 103 statements taken in the 
first three days, 32 (31%) contained allegations 
of shooting while surrendering. 
Only one of the 124 statements was taken on 
Friday the 17th and this did not refer to anyone 
being SWS. Statement taking got under way 
more fully, at the Bethanie and Jericho police 
stations, on Saturday 18 August. At Jericho 
Police Station seven of the statements that were 
taken on the 18th provided shooting descriptions 
and three of these included SWS allegations. 
Likewise at Jericho three of the seven 
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statements that were taken on the 18th and 
that provided shooting descriptions included 
SWS allegations. 
Of the statements taken at both stations on 
that day from strikers who were apparently at 
Scene 2, a large number contain no shooting 
description. This is likely to have been a 
consequence of the factors discussed above. 
The available information shows that virtually all 
of the arrested strikers were arrested at Scene 
2 and that it is highly unlikely that people who 
were present at Scene 2 would not have been 
aware of the shootings.
More than half of the statements in the sample 
(52%) were taken from strikers at Bethanie 
Police Station. It is therefore unsurprising 
that 50% of the statements that specifically 
Table 2: Dates on which statements were taken
Table 3: Locations at which statements were taken
Date unclear 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st Total
Statements 
taken 
8 1 0 63 0 18 124
Scene 2 
SWS 
5 0 7 20 2 12 46
 % SWS 63% 0% 23% 32% 67% 67% 37%
Location All Bethanie  
therefore 
assumed to 
be 18th or 19th
Pelgerae 
Hospital
16 Bethanie; 
13 Jericho; 
2 not 
specified
40 Bethanie; 
21 Phokeng; 
2 not 
specified
2 Phokeng; 
1 Marikana 
Hospital 
17 Mogwase; 
1 Marikana 
Hospital 
124
Bethanie 
Police 
Station
Jericho 
Police 
Station
Mogwase 
Police 
Station
Phokeng 
Police 
Station
Hospitals
Not 
specified Total
Statements 
taken
64 0 17 23 377 4 124
Scene 2 SWS 23 3 12 6 1 1 46
% of all 124 
statements 
52% 10% 14% 19% 2% 3% 100%
% SWS 
allegations in 
statements 
from this 
location 
36% 23% 71% 22% 33% 25% 37%
mentioned shooting while surrendering (23 of 
46) were made by strikers at Bethanie Police 
Station. Nevertheless, SWS allegations emerged 
from strikers at all four police stations as well as 
from one of the three strikers in the sample who 
were in hospital when their statements were 
taken. Therefore, in the five days after the strike, 
SWS allegations emerged from strikers at five 
independent locations (Table 3). 
It is also worth noting that 29 different 
statement takers were involved in taking the 
124 statements, and that most of them only 
took statements at one location. The allegations 
that strikers were shot while surrendering 
were therefore recorded by at least 18 of 
the 29 statement takers (62%), indicating 
that the evidence of people being shot while 
INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES & UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN18
surrendering did not originate from a small 
group of IPID staff who misinterpreted the verbal 
accounts provided by the strikers or deliberately 
introduced misleading evidence.
Many of the statements also contained 
allegations of assaults or other vindictive 
conduct by police against strikers after the 
shooting. Sixty-nine of the 124 strikers made 
allegations of this kind, the vast majority of 
whom asserted that strikers were assaulted 
at Scene 2 after the shootings were over and 
they were being rounded up and arrested. 
Strikers who made allegations of being shot 
while surrendering were not more likely to allege 
that they or others had been assaulted (Table 
4). This suggests that allegations of being 
shot while surrendering do not indicate a bias 
towards making allegations against the police. 
Finally, it is worth noting that there were two 
police officers who claimed in their statements 
that they had called on other police to 
stop shooting at the strikers at Scene 2.78 
Altogether, 14 of the strikers’ statements also 
described police officers calling for other police 
to stop shooting.79 Of these, seven (50%) 
were statements by strikers who also made 
allegations of shooting while surrendering. This 
is a further indication that the SWS allegations 
represent objective descriptions of the events 
at Scene 2, and are not evidence of a tendency 
towards making unjustified accusations against 
the police.  
Conclusion 
This article does not provide a full account 
of the events at Scene 2, but focuses on the 
statements taken from injured and arrested 
strikers, in particular statements indicating that 
strikers were shot while surrendering. 
The analysis shows that these allegations 
emerged at diverse locations, and from an early 
stage in the process of recording statements. 
Ultimately, such allegations would be recorded 
by 18 different IPID personnel from strikers 
at five distinct locations in the five days 
immediately after the massacre. The statements 
have other features that indicate that those 
making the allegations were not biased against 
the police; for example, not over-representing 
allegations of assault and presenting information 
that portrayed police in a positive manner.  
This analysis supports the SAHRC’s assertion 
that the allegations of being shot while 
surrendering are not based on collusion ‘to 
produce a false account’.80 Considering 
the circumstances in which these accounts 
emerged, it is implausible that they reflect 
an attempt to falsely incriminate the police 
and suppress alternative information. Taken 
collectively, these statements can therefore be 
regarded as a reliable source of information that 
Table 4:  Percentage of arrested strikers who allegedly experienced or witnessed assaults –  
 classified by type of Scene 2 shooting description
Type of shooting description at Scene 2 No assault Assault 
or other 
vindictive 
action
Total % alleging 
assault 
or other 
vindictive 
action 
No Scene 2 shooting described 11 21 32 66%
Scene 2 SWS 23 23 46 50%
Other Scene 2 shooting description 21 22 43 51%
SWS described but unclear if at Scene 1 or Scene 2  1 2 3 67%
Total 56 68 124 55%
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some of the strikers at Scene 2 were indeed 
shot while surrendering.
It is also worth noting that there is not a single 
reference in any of the statements to strikers 
shooting at or attacking SAPS members with 
dangerous weapons at Scene 2, despite such 
allegations by the police.81 This supports other 
evidence that suggests that police claims that 
they were acting in self-defence when they shot 
the strikers were false.82
But if they were not attacking the police, why 
were they shot in this way? Existing analyses 
of the massacre have focused on political 
influences, and some have alleged collusion 
between Lonmin and the police to kill the 
strikers.83 The evidence presented to the 
commission does not support the view that this 
is what motivated the police shootings at Scene 
2.84 What characterised the leadership of the 
operation was not any explicitly formed lethal 
intention, but the recognition of the potential for 
substantial loss of life and the absence of any 
significant will or intention to prevent it.85
Although it made no findings about the 
reasonableness or legality of the police 
shootings, the Marikana Commission did reach 
at least one significant set of conclusions about 
the events at Scene 2, namely that there was no 
effective command and control of the police.86 
Factors that contributed to the absence of 
command and control included the neglect of 
planning and briefing owing to the hasty manner 
in which the operation was launched,87 and 
blurred lines of command at senior level.88 An 
additional factor that profoundly shaped the 
manner in which the operation was planned 
and conducted was that it took place during 
a period in which Public Order Policing units 
had fallen into neglect, while the status of the 
SAPS’s militarised ‘tactical’ units had been 
elevated and they were being used more 
frequently in crowd management.89 
The implication is that the shootings at Scene 
2 need to be understood against the backdrop 
of an absence of command and control 
of SAPS units that were not well trained in 
crowd management. At one point during the 
commission process, the SAPS argued that 
its members at Scene 2 shot some of the 
strikers because, having heard gunfire from 
other SAPS units, they mistakenly believed 
that they were being fired at by the strikers.90 
However, given that there were a large number 
of people gathered in the Scene 2 area, it was 
reckless to fire without identifying the source of 
the gunfire and ensuring that innocent people 
were not endangered. The police could also 
have withdrawn and taken cover, making such 
retaliatory fire unnecessary. This strategy, which 
would have provided police with the time to 
identify where gunfire was coming from,91 
should have been familiar to the tactical units 
that were responsible for much of the gunfire at 
Scene 2.92    
One key detail that is not addressed by the 
statements is whether the strikers who were 
shot while surrendering were visible to the police 
who shot them. There is evidence that some 
of the SAPS shooters fired into the Scene 2 
area from locations on the south side.93 It is not 
clear if the strikers that they were shooting at 
would have been clearly visible, as they may 
have been concealed by foliage. However, 
the evidence also shows that some of the 
police who fired into the killing zone area were 
positioned on top of the high rocks.94 These 
police are likely to have been able to see the 
strikers at whom they were shooting. They 
would likely have been aware that some strikers 
had their hands raised while others were taking 
shelter behind rocks and other available cover. If 
these police members fired at the surrendering 
strikers, it raises the possibility that the killings at 
Scene 2 involved the ‘intentional unlawful killing 
of strikers by SAPS members’.95
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